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I. Introduction 
This article seeks to analyse what is the purpose competition law serves in 
today’s society and reflect on how significant public authorities are in its application, 
both with an active and passive role. 
Under the European model of  the enforcement of  competition law, 
administration (not jurisdiction) has the role of  applying, in the first instance, 
regulations to defend competition. This raises the question on how the administration 
that applies the rules and acts largely as a regulator itself, can be also subject to 
competition rules. Also, it is necessary to analyze the main channels open to 
competition authorities, in order to bring to light possible breaches of  competition 
principles committed by administrations and which are the most useful tools for 
stopping them.1  
II. A global perspective of  competition law 
Competition law is one of  the most effective responses the State and public 
authorities in general have to prevent abusive practices from being committed by the 
strongest market operators in an attempt to maximise their profits, to the detriment 
of  weaker operators and, ultimately, consumers.2 
Competition policies also seek to enforce market rules on public authorities 
themselves.3 The aim is to stablish limits to their ability to regulate sectors so as to 
guarantee freedom of  business. The administrations are not subject to the same 
rules applied to private operators, but the same principles need to be respected, so 
that opportunities for all are protected, and that the provision of  public services is 
offered in the best possible conditions so that the public interest is safeguarded.4 
In this area, as in many others, the globalisation of  the economy has made the 
protection of  domestic markets via national legislation in each country (which is 
absolutely essential in any economy that seeks reasonable levels of  competitiveness) 
fundamental but insufficient in itself  for achieving the desired goals.5 
Various supra-national bodies have, therefore, striven to introduce closer 
harmony in the principles that govern competition rules and to foster extra-territorial 
enforcement. The aim is to effectively apply shared principles and combat the 
practices of  large-scale operators which are capable of  extending their operations 
1 Ricardo Alonso Soto, “Recomendaciones de la CNC a las administraciones pública”, Boletín 
Informativo Gomez-Acebo & Pombo Abogados 4 (2008) 16- 21; Ricardo Alonso Soto, “Recomendaciones 
de la CNC a las administraciones pública”, Boletín Informativo Gomez-Acebo & Pombo Abogados 5 (2009) 
18-27. 
2 Oles Andriychuk, “Can we protect competition without protecting consumers?”, Competition Law Review, v. 
6, issue 1 (2009) 77 - 88; CSERES, Kj, “What has competition done for consumers in Liberalised Markets?”, 
Competition Law Review, v. 4, issue 2 (2008) 77 - 121; Maria Ioannidou, “Enhancing the Consumers’ 
Role in EU Private Competition Law Enforcement: A normative and practical approach”, Competition Law 
Review, v. 8,  issue 1 (2011) 59 - 85. 
3 Tomás Arranz and Luis Moscoso del Prado, “Desarrollo reciente de la aplicación de las normas de defensa 
de la competencia a las Administraciones Públicas”, Revista Actualidad Jurídica URIA 32 (2012): 85-89.  
4 Maria Pilar Canedo Arrillaga, “El derecho de la competencia ante la globalización y la crisis” in 
Retos del Derecho ante una economía sin fronteras (Bilbao: Deusto, 2012): 231-239. 
5 Qianlan Wu, Competition laws, globalization and legal pluralism: China’s experience (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2013); David J. Gerber; “Globalization and Legal Knowledge: Implications for Comparative Law”, 
Tul. L. Review 75 (2001); David J. Gerber, “Europe and the globalization of  Antitrust Law”, Conn. J. Int’l 
L. 14 (1999). 
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beyind national borders and setting up wherever is most favourable to their own 
particular interests.6 
The efforts made by the European Union in the field of  the supra-national 
protection of  competition law certainly stand out above the rest in terms of  their 
generalisation across the Member States, of  their effects on the markets in those 
States, and of  their extra-territorial consequences.7 Ever since the EU was founded, 
its Treaties have included rules inspired, partially, by German regulations and partially, 
by US regulations (or rather set up in response to the latter). The goal of  a Single 
Market within the EU cannot be achieved without effective competition. The idea 
that underlies the Single Market is to make the EU a single territory in which people, 
capital, goods and services interact freely, thus fostering competition and trade and 
improving efficacy.8 
There is firm evidence that a wider choice of  goods and services increases 
quality and reduces prices, which leads to greater prosperity for the market and for 
consumers.9 For the advantages of  the Single Market to filter down to all individuals 
and small businesses, suppliers and service providers must be able to compete fairly 
for every contract.10 Only effective competition can bring about low prices, higher 
quality and more variety on offer to consumers. The governments of  the European 
Union have delegated broad powers to the European Commission for the application 
of  anti-trust legislation to enforce its rules on competition, with the express purpose 
of  directly benefiting consumers.11 
Along with its day-to-day remit of  protecting markets, in regard to action by 
businesses, the Commission also supervises competition in public services (including 
such important services as telecommunications, electricity and gas), in which the EU 
has done away with the old state-run monopolies.12 It also seeks to ensure that public 
procurement operations take place in line with the rules of  the game of  any effective 
market.13 Its objective in this is to strike a reasonable balance, to ensure that the State 
(directly or through publicly run companies) cannot use its privileged situation in the 
market to harm new or weaker operators, and, at the same time, to ensure that basic 
6 Chris Noonan, “Globalisation, international enforcement and extraterritoriality”, Competition Law Review, 
v. 5, issue 2 (2009) 147 - 151. 
7 Fraser Cameron, “The European Union as a model for regional integration”, Council on Foreign 
Relations, Working Paper (2010). 
8 Alina Kaczorowska, “The objectives of  the competition policy of  the CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
(CSME) and their importance to the development of  a coherent and comprehensive body of  substantive competition 
rules in the CSME”, Competition Law Review, v. 8, issue 2, (2012): 185 - 207; Matteo Negrinotti, 
“The single market imperative and consumer welfare: irreconcilable goals? Exploring the tensions 
amongst the objectives of  European competition law through the lens of  parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals”, in The goals of  competition law, ed., Daniel Zimmer (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2012), 295-337.  
9 M. J. Vázquez Pena, El derecho de la libre competencia como instrumento de progreso económico a favor de las 
empresas y de los consumidores (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2013). 
10 David Ortega Pesciña, “Defensa de la competencia y protección de los consumidores - Una visión 
consumerista practica”, Boletín Latinoamericano de Competencia 21 (2006): 158-165. 
11 Jose Antonio Rodriguez Miguez, “Descentralización y eficiencia en la protección de los consumidores y la 
competencia: El caso Español”, Revista de Derecho de la Competencia, v. 10, issue 10 (2014): 207-233. 
12 Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia, Informe sobre remedios políticos que pueden favorecer la 
competencia en los servicios y atajar el daño causado por los monopolios (1993). 
13 Natalia Fabra, “El funcionamiento del mercado eléctrico español bajo la ley del sector eléctrico” 
in Energía: del monopolio al mercado, ed. José Luis García Delgado (Cizur Menor: Thomson-Civitas, 
2006): 247 - 275. 
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services are provided which are affordable to lower-income customers and disabled 
persons, and to those who live in remote or peripheral regions.14
The Commission also monitors the potential effects of  state aid on markets, 
as they may distort competition between companies and affect trade between 
EU countries.15 If  some firms receive government support, this could be seen as 
giving them an unjustified advantage over their competitors. This is why EU rules, 
in general, prohibit state aid, though some exemptions are permitted, e.g. for less 
favoured regions, small businesses and certain frameworks that foster research and 
development, environmental protection, training, employment and culture.  
III. Administrations and competition law
Traditionally, competition law was intended to protect markets against private 
operators which, for whatever reason, seek to alter the rules of  the game for their own 
benefit, and therefore, in detriment of  the interests of  their competitors, consumers 
and, ultimately, of  society as a whole. Conventionally, competition policies have been 
aimed directly at businesses (especially at the most economically powerful ones) 
which see the absolute freedom of  the traditional laissez-faire system as an ideal 
medium for altering markets for their own benefit. 
However, questions have recently begun to be asked regarding the extent to 
which the actions of  public-sector actors can alter free competition, by -more or 
less consciously- favouring certain operators for various reasons, to detriment of  the 
general interest that their ations should be seeking to protect.16 
The leading international organisations in the field, such as the OECD, 
UNCTAD and indeed the EU itself, have begun to implement a number of  schemes 
intended to show that inappropriate actions by public administrations can cause 
breaches of  competition laws, with consequences just as serious as those caused by 
businesses, and may, indeed, have more negative effects than those caused by the 
private sector.17 
In terms of  both the task of  regulation in itself  and of  the leading role of  
administrations in public procurement, dysfunctions caused by public administrations 
can be harmful to the general interest, and must, therefore, be taken into account 
and avoided insofar as is possible, as a way of  achieving a fairer, more efficient 
contribution to the welfare state.18 
14 Gerard Pérez Olmo et al, “El derecho de la competencia y las instituciones (o viaje de un casi 
monopolio a un mundo competitivo)” in La Ley 15/2007, de Defensa de la Competencia, capítulo I 
Aspectos institucionales, ed. Antonio Creus Carreras (Madrid: La Ley, 2008), 25-42. 
15 Conor Quigley, European state aid law and policy (Oxford: Hart Publishing,2015); F. J. Säcker and F. 
Montag, European state aid law: a commentary (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); E. Moavero Milanesi, “The 
importance of  the state aids rules of  the european union in the context of  the global financial and economic crisis”, 
Italian Antitrust Review, v. 1, issue 3 (2014): 1-6; Vittorio di Bucci, “The modernisation of  state aid control 
and its objectives: clarity, relevance, effectiveness”, Italian Antitrust Review, v. 1, issue 3 (2014): 7-23; Andrea 
Biondi, “The boundaries of  EU state aid control rules”, Italian Antitrust Review, v. 2, issue 1 (2015): 1-5. 
16 Paloma Ávila, “El papel de la Comisión Nacional de la Competencia en la actividad de la 
regulación de las administraciones públicas” in Derecho de la competencia y regulación en la actividad de las 
administraciones públicas, ed. Javier Guillén Caramés (Cizur Menor: Civitas Thomson Reuters, 2011), 
375-392.  
17 José María Baño León, “La aplicación del derecho antitrust a la administración pública” in Derecho 
de la competencia …., 61-86. 
18 Julio Costas Comesaña, “La sujeción de la actividad de la Administración al Derecho de la 
Competencia”, Estudios de derecho mercantil: Libro homenaje al Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. José Antonio Gómez Segade, 
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1. The role of  the administration in applying regulations to defend 
competition 
One way in which the public administration can influence markets and distort 
free competition is through laxity in the application of  rules in certain social 
situations. Economic crises seem to be a breeding ground for complaints of  laxity in 
the application of  competition rules.19
The reason for of  this behaviour is that, although the protection of  competition 
rights is seen as clearly positive in terms of  the general good and of  consumer 
protection, it is also viewed less favourably by firms and other operators, who see the 
resulting rules as constraints that prevent them from using the most effective ways 
of  making the biggest, fastest profits.20 
In times of  serious economic crises, there is a tendency to call for greater 
protectionism and more constraints on competition in markets, allegedly to help 
sustain the economy until better times come around.21 
Competition law clearly limits freedom of  business and constrains the freedom 
to reach agreements, as the State seeks to protect the interests of  the weakest links in 
the economic chain.22 It must also be recognised that by establishing such protection, 
the State limits its own actions and its own freedom of  action for the sake of  the 
common good.23 
When a crisis threatens the survival of  numerous firms, it is no surprise that 
the argument is raised that maintaining constraints on the actions of  businesses is 
conducive to their decline, with all the serious, negative consequences for society that 
may be associated with firms going out of  business.24 
In those circumstances, national and international authorities are asked to be 
more flexible in applying competition law, or indeed to cease to apply it altogether 
to certain sectors or over a certain timeframe.25 Answering to those questions in a 
positive way would be a mistake.26
This is a call for limits on the control of  restrictive conduct on the part of  
businesses, so exemptions from prohibition are extended to certain ‘restructuring 
agreements’, with the application of  an exemption for acquisitions in bankruptcy in 
ed. Ana María Tobío Rivas et al. (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2013), 369-381. 
19 Santiago Martínez Lage and Amadeo Petitbó Juan (ed), El derecho de la competencia en tiempos de crisis 
(Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2010). 
20 Aleix Calveiras and Juanjo Ganuza, “Ante la crisis ecónomica, apostar por la competencia” 
[“Supporting Competition in the Face of  the Economic Crisis”] in Lo que podemos aprender de la crisis 
para España ¿Qué hacer para salir de esta crisis?, s/e, e-book (Sociedad Abierta, 2010). 
21 Rosa Otxoa-Errate Goikoetxea; Igone Altzelai Uliondo and Juan Manuel Velázquez Gardeta, Pyme 
y crisis económica: respuestas normativas de la UE (Cizur Menor: Aranzadi, 2010). 
22 Ana Balcells Cartagena, “European competition policy during the crisis: the approach of  the 
European Comission”, in Derecho de la Competencia europeo y español, ed.  Luis Ortiz Blanco et al 
(Madrid: Dykinson, 2013), 391 - 444. 
23 Arianna Andreangeli, “EU competition law in times of  crisis: between present challenges and a largely 
unwritten future”, Competition Law Review, v. 9, issue 2 (2013): 91-118. 
24 European Commission, “Internal market: from crisis to opportunity - putting citizens and companies on the 
path to prosperity”, The EU Explained (Brussels: EC, 2014). 
25 L. Berenguer Giménez, “El derecho de la competencia en un marco de crisis global” [“Competition law in the 
framework of  a global crisis”] in Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas de Elche, v. 1, 
issue 6 (2010): 1-12. 
26 Juan Ignacio Signes de Mesa, Derecho de la competencia y crisis económica. El régimen de ayudas públicas y de 
concentraciones en el sector financiero (Pamplona: Aranzadi, 2013). 
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company concentration, or with temporary relaxation of  control procedures in the 
control of  public-sector aid to allow aid in sectors or at thresholds where it would 
not generally be permitted.27 
These arguments must be seen as a trap by firms for the market, the economy 
and the best interests of  the weakest links in the chain.28 
It is true that crises can have negative consequences for business, for the market 
and for consumers.29 However, it is a fallacy to argue that a more permissive approach 
towards abusive practices can help remedy matters.30 
The essence of  free competition is to reward the most efficient operators 
and expel the least efficient ones from the market: this is beneficial to the general 
interest.31 Also, it results in a renewal of  production structures to adapt to changing 
market situations.32 
That does not mean that national and supra-national authorities should ignore 
the short-term situations of  businesses, but they must act with caution.33
When agreements can help to improve output or distribution, can foster 
technical and financial progress, can reserve a fair share in profits for users and 
can establish restraints that are essential for restructuring, certain measures may be 
permissible provided that a limited timeframe is maintained.34 Another option, which 
is perhaps less harmful to the general interest and more in accordance with the most 
effective competition policies, is merely to reduce the fines imposed if  the crisis is 
found to be a true mitigating circumstance in any liabilities.35 
In cases of  business concentrations, for the crisis to be taken into account, there 
27 Miguel Moura e Silva, “Antitrust in distress: causes and consequences of  the financial crisis” in Competition 
Law Review, v. 9, issue 2 (2013) 119-132. 
28 Gianni lo Schiavo, “The impact of  the EU crisis-related framework on state aids to financial institutions: from 
past practice to future prospects” in Competition Law Review, v. 9, issue 2 (2013): 135-168. 
29 Luís Silva Morais, “Competition law and policy in times of  crisis and economic change”, in Competition Law 
Review, v. 9, issue 2, (2013): 81-90.  
30 Henk Don and Siún O’Keeffe, “Competition in times of  crisis: we cannot afford to forget it”, in Italian 
Antitrust Review, v. 2, issue 1 (2015): 25-34. 
31 Julio Costas Comesaña, “Cárteles de crisis” in El derecho de la competencia en tiempos de crisis, ed. 
Santiago Martínez Lage (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2010), 43-64. 
32 Juan Ignacio Signes De Mesa, Derecho de la competência… 
33 José Antonio Rodríguez Míguez, “Ayudas a la banca y crisis financiera en España”, in Estudios de 
derecho mercantil… 
34 On several occasions the European Commission has refused to relax competition rules when 
a crisis was alleged as a reason (the case of  the zinc producer group on 6/08/1984, OJ L 220; 
the case of  polypropylene on 23/04/1986, OJ L 230; the decision on bituminous coverings on 
10/07/1986, OJ L 232; the cases of  PVC and LdPE on 21/12/1988, OJ L 74 of  1989; the decision 
on electro-welded mesh on 2/08/1989, OJ L 260). However, on other occasions authorisation has 
been granted, with the precautions indicated above. Examples include the decision on synthetic 
fibres on 4/07/1984, OJ L 207 of  1984 and the Stichting Baksteen case (decision on 29/04/1994, 
IV/34.456). The same can be said of  reciprocal specialisation agreements between firms with 
structural overcapacity, which are intended to bring about a co-ordinated reduction in economically 
unbearable overcapacity by closing down the most obsolete facilities and having each firms 
specialise in the sector in which it is likely to be most competitive once it is restructured, though this 
may in no case include agreements on prices, market shares or distribution. See also the cases of  
Bayer/BP Chemicals, Decision 5/05/1988, IV/32.075 and Enichem/ICI Enichem/ICI, Decision 
22/121987, IV/31.846. 
35 Rafael Allendesalazar and Roberto Vallina, “Aplicación de las normas de competencia a las 
restricciones verticales en épocas de crisis”, in El derecho de la competencia…; Massimo Merola; Jacques 
Derenne; José Rivas (eds.), Competition Law in times of  Economic Crisis. In Need of  Adjustment? 
(Brussels: Bruylant, 2013). 
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must be no causal link between the concentration process and the deterioration in 
effective competition.36 This means that for the concentration process to be allowed, 
the company affected by the crisis must be bound to leave the market in the near 
future unless it is acquired by another company, there must be no other possibility of  
purchase that is less harmful to competition than the concentration announced, and 
it must be confirmed that if  the concentration process does not take place, the assets 
of  the company in difficulty will inevitably be lost from the market.37
In the case of  aid, resalistic, consistent, far-reaching restructuring plans are 
generally required that are aimed at restoring company viability in the long-term. 
Aid is also made conditional on the re-establishment of  long-term viability, on there 
being no undue distortion of  competition (so that the positive effects outweigh the 
negative ones), on the limiting of  aid to such amounts and times as are necessary for 
the restructuring process to attain its goals, on the full application of  the restructuring 
plan and on supervision and annual reports.38 
The final response of  the Commission can be found in the Communication 
from the Commission – Temporary Community Framework for State Aid Measures 
to Support Finance in the Current Financial and Economic Crisis.39
2. The administration under the application of  competition 
principles. Better regulation policies
As mentioned above, one way in which public administrations can alter the rules 
of  the free market is through State aid. Such aid is regulated at both, Community, 
and domestic levels, establishing the criteria under which States can lawfully protect 
businesses in certain sectors or certain circumstances to favour their entry into 
markets or help them to remain there. However, this is not the only way in which 
administrations can influence markets. 
The regulatory functions of  public administrations habitually affect the 
operation of  markets.40 It is commonplace for sectoral regulations to include rules 
that establish certain modes of  operation recognised by the regulator which favour 
certain sectors or groups.41 Defending competition is a worthwhile task on the part 
of  public administrations, but it needs to be weighed up against other principles 
36 Antonio Martínez Sánchez and Jaime Rodríguez Ordóñez, “Procedimiento especial para la 
aprobación de concentraciones en tiempos de crisis”, in El derecho de la competencia… 
37 In this regard, see the decision Kali und Salz of  14/12/1993 (case M.308), OJ L 186 of  
21/07/1994, p. 38 ss., section 71; the Court of  Justice judgement Kali und Salz, case C-68/94, 
of  31/03/1998, section 110; the Basf  decision on 11/07/2001 (COMP/M.2314), OJ L 132 of  
17/05/2002, sections 157-160. Jorge Manzarbeitia and Pedro Callol, “Intervención pública en momentos 
de crisis: el derecho de ayudas de Estado aplicado a la intervención pública directa en las empresas”, Serie Política 
de la Competencia, issue 29 (2009). 
38 Cani Fernández, “La supervivencia de las compañías en crisis (Failing Firm Defense)”, in El 
derecho de la competencia…; Marcos Araujo, “Los remedios aplicados a concentraciones en tiempos 
de crisis”, in El derecho de la competencia…; Juan Delgado and Eva Ferraz, “Política de competencia, 
política industrial y campeones nacionales en tiempos de crisis”, in El derecho de la competencia… 
39 (OJ C 16/1 de 2009). Initially extended up to 31/12/2011 but in fact still in force, in view of  the 
current economic situation. 
40 Carlos Gómez Asensio, La mejora regulatoria (Better Regulation) Aplicaciones en materia de contratación 
pública (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2013). 
41 Adrien de Hauteclocque, Market building through antitrust, long-term contract regulation in EU electricity 
markets (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013). 
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that favour the common good.42 This argument leads numerous administrations to 
approve rules that favour certain operators, often to detriment of  the best interests 
of  the market and of  consumers. 
Certain heavyweight business organisations, lobbies and professional 
associations can influence political decision-making bodies sufficiently and lead 
administrations to adopt measures that do not truly coincide with the common good 
more often than would be desirable.43 
Controlling public administrations in such cases is a complex matter. 
Competition rules can only be applied by administrative authorities to companies 
or operators working in a given market. This requirement is not met in the case of  
administrations acting as regulators.44 Thus, to the extent that a public administration 
creates a set of  regulations and exercises powers as an imperium, it places itself  beyond 
the sanctioning reach of  the competition authorities and raises a shield of  impunity 
over those businesses that benefit from the rules applied, generally to the detriment 
of  consumers. 
A. Supranational rules as reference to liberalisation
There are two ways in which our legislation can take action against this clearly 
undesirable situation.45 One way of  protecting markets against abusive actions by the 
administration is through supra-national regulations (particularly EU regulations in 
our case) that protect the values closest to the general interest and thus, favour the 
common good.46
A clear example of  this situation can be found in the European Union in the 
form of  the so-called Services Directive.47 This Directive has led to a real shake-up 
in the organisation of  professional services for benefit of  consumers.48 The approval 
of  the Directive in 2006 and its transposition into Spanish law in 2009 sought to 
create a framework for regulating professional services that would be consistent with 
the defence of  free competition in the markets affected.49 The reforms introduced 
by the Directive call for proper application by the institutions involved in preparing 
and implementing them, to avoid tension between the principles contained in the 
42 Björn Lundqvist, Standarization under EU competition rules and US antitrust laws: the rise and limits of  
self-regulation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014). 
43 Kevin Coates, Competition law and regulation of  the tecnology markets (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
44 Niamh Dunne, Competition law and economic regulation: making and managing markets (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
45 Josef  Drexl and Fabiana di Porto (eds.), Competition law as regulation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2015). 
46 Giorgio Monti, “Managing the intersection of  utilities regulation and EC competition law”, in Competition 
Law Review, v. 4, issue 2, (2008): 123-145. 
47 Markus Krajewski, National regulation and trade liberalization in services - the legal impact of  General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on national regulatory autonomy (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003). 
48 Isabel Sánchez, “La transposición de la Directiva de servicios en España”, in El derecho de la 
competencia…; Josu J. Sagasti Aurrekoetchea, “La normativa de liberalización de servicios y la actividad 
de notario y de profesiones jurídicas” in Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario 730 (2012): 745-797 
49 Directive 2006/123/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 December 2006 
on services in the internal market, OJ L 376 of  27.12.2006, pp. 36-68; Act 25/2009 of  22 December 
on the amendment of  various laws to bring them into line with the Act on Free Access to Service 
Activities and Their Exercising (the Omnibus Act) and Act 17/2009 of  23 November on Free 
Access to Service Activities and Their Exercising (the Umbrella Act). 
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Regulations and the way in which they are applied.50
These Regulations have given rise, for instance, to in-depth discussions on the 
role to be played by professional associations as a barrier to entry in certain markets, 
or as a form of  corporatist protection of  members against market competition.51 That 
discussion led the administration to consider introducing changes to the rules, given 
that under EU Regulations, professional associations with compulsory membership 
are only permitted if  such associations already exist.52
Inside the European countries, and with regard to the existence and operation 
of  certain professional associations, it is clear that “there continue to be numerous barriers 
to access to professional activities and to the practising of  a profession that prevent or hinder 
freedom of  provision of  professional services”.53 It is also significant that there is “a lack of  
specific adaptation of  the Regulations in place in the autonomous regions governing professional 
associations, to the reforms envisaged in basic nationwide legislation, thus fostering the geographical 
compartmentalising of  the domestic market and reducing the potential for competition in the 
various territories”.54 This is why it would be advisable that the government specify 
what activities and professions should be subject to an exceptional framework 
of  compulsory membership of  associations, bearing in mind that compulsory 
membership is a major constraint on competition, “so that in all those cases in which it 
is deemed necessary, reasonable justification must be given of  the need, the proportionality and the 
absence of  discrimination of  the relevant measure”.55
Spain’s Constitutional Court had already indicated that it was up to lawmakers 
to determine what professions were excluded from the general principle of  freedom, 
in order to assess which of  them required compulsory membership of  a professional 
association and, as the case may be, to determine the degree of  importance that 
should be attributed to qualifications as a prerequisite for practising a profession.56 
The Spanish Constitutional Court also indicates that for a profession to be 
classed as requiring compulsory membership of  a professional association, it is 
necessary from a constitutional point of  view, to imply a general interest that could be 
affected.57 In other words there must be constitutionally significant public purposes 
in the activity made by those professionals.58 The legitimacy of  such decisions 
50 Comisión Nacional de la Competencia. Informe sobre los colegios profesionales tras la transposición de la 
Directiva de Servicios. Madrid, 26 de abril de 2012, en CNC, http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/
Noticias/tabid/105/Default.aspx?Contentid=475051.
51 Christian Bergqvist, Between regulation and deregulation (Copenhage: Djof  Publishing, 2017). 
52 Germà Bel, Joan Calzada and  Xavier Fageda, “Liberalización en los servicios públicos de red” in Anuario 
de la competencia (2006): 177-208. 
53 Report by Spain’s Competition Authority dated May 2012, “Los Colegios Profesionales tras la 
transposición de la Directiva de Servicios” [“Professional Associations Following the Transposition 
of  the Services Directive”]. 
54 M.P. Espinoza, A. Ciarreta and A. Zurimendi, Reforma del mercado de servicios profesionales (Madrid: 
Funcas, 2014). 
55 Juan Espinosa García, “Servicios públicos locales y competencia” en Derecho de la competencia y 
regulación… ; Comisión Nacional de ka Competencia, Informe sobre el sector de servicios profesionales y los 
colegios profesionales, Madrid, Septiembre de 2008. 
56 Constitutional Court judgements 194/1998 and TC 76/2003 of  23 April, FJ 4. 
57 Luis Berenguer Fuster, “La necesaria modernización de los colegios profesionales en España” in Anuario de 
la Competencia (2010): 13-36; Comisión Nacional de Competencia, I26/0007/08 Recomendaciones a 
las Administraciones Públicas para una regulación de los mercados más eficiente y favorecedora de la competencia, 
Madrid, 18 de junio de 2008. 
58 Germán Fernández Farreres et al, Colegios Profesionales y Derecho de la Competencia (Madrid: Civitas, 
2002). 
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depends on whether professional associations effectively play a role in safeguarding 
the interests of  the recipients of  the services provided by their members59 and also, 
on the relationship that exists between each specific professional activity and specific 
rights, values and goods that are protected under the constitution.60
There is, therefore, an obligation incumbent upon public administrations (the 
central Spanish administration as regards basic issues and also the administrations 
of  the autonomous regions) to amend their Regulations to bring professions into 
line with supra-national Directives and, thus, protect competition and consumers.61 
Otherwise, the interest of  the lobbies would be protected over the interest of  the 
clients.62 
B. The capacity to challenge rules before the courts
The second way of  controlling the regulatory role of  the administration 
is to challenge, in court, the regulations that have recently been approved by the 
administration if  they are deemed contrary to the competition principles. 
Spanish Competition Law permits central and regional competition authorities 
to file objections before competent courts for maintaining effective competition in 
markets [Articles 12(3) and 13(2) Competition Act].63 The aim is to challenge acts 
of  public administrations and general provisions of  the administration, if  their rank 
is below the law and if  those acts give rise to obstacles to free competition in the 
market.64 
The Competition Act openly envisages the possibility of  competition authorities 
going to the courts and appealling national, regional or local regulations that are 
deemed to be in breach of  the principles of  competition and, therefore, detrimental 
to the interests of  consumers and contrary to the public good, or biased in favour of  
certain operators or groups of  operators.65 
This legal instrument is regarded as a last resort that is to be used restrictively, 
due to the dysfunctions that Regulations in force can generate in markets.66 
59 Francisco Javier de Ahumada Ramos, “Colegios profesionales: régimen aplicable y propuestas 
para un cambio de modelo”, in Las técnicas de regulación para la Competencia: una visión horizontal de los 
sectores regulados, ed. Juan Alfonso Santamaría Pastor et al (Madrid: Iustel, 2011), 573-613. 
60 Supreme Court judgement of  26 April 2010. 
61 Consejo General del Poder Judicial. Los colegios profesionales. Administración corporativa (Madrid, 2001). 
62 G. Aranzabe Pablos, “Colegios Profesionales y Defensa de la Competencia: la experiencia vasca”, 
in Gaceta Jurídica de la Unión Europea y de la Competencia, La Ley, issue 12, (2009): 43-54. 
63 Alfredo González-Panizo Tamargo, “Legitimación activa de la CNC para el ejercicio de acciones 
jurisdiccionales: objeto, motivos de impugnación y pretensiones ejercitables” in Anuario de la Competencia 
(2010): 115-132.  
64 Javier Guillén Caramés, “La impugnación por las autoridades de competencia de las actuaciones 
de las administraciones públicas restrictivas del derecho de la competencia” in Derecho de la 
competencia y regulación… 
65 This possibility has been invoqued by the National Competition Authority, which has appealed 
against decrees in the field of  transport issued by the regional governments of  Valencia and Galicia, 
and against one set of  national regulations. The National Competition Authorithy has used the 
option 8 times. Also the Basque Competition Authority has used the option 7 times for transport 
contracts and local regulations about restaurants and bars. 
66 Javier Guillén Caramés, “La promoción de la competencia como refuerzo al ejercicio de potestad 
sancionadora por parte de las autoridades de competencia: en especial, la impugnación de la actividad 
administrativa contraria al Derecho de la Competencia” in Cuestiones actuales del procedimiento sancionador 
en Derecho de la Competencia, ed. Javier Guillén Caramés (Cizur Menor: Civitas, 2013), 369-399.
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The advocacy power is considered to be of  crucial importance in this regard.67 
Thus, there are general and specific reports addressed to public administrations that 
offer them instruments for improving their regulatory work.68 
The possibility of  drawing up reports during the lifetime of  regulatory processes 
that can be used preventively to forestall problems of  competition arising from 
regulations as they are drawn up could be another equally effective and less intrusive 
system.69 This solution entails that such reports are actually taken into account by the 
administrations charged with setting up regulations.70
The Spanish Competition Act assumes that those powers of  competition 
authorities just work when there is no Regulation with the rank of  law that limits 
competition principles.71 Those riules give rise to legitimate expectations on the 
part of  operators and it is established that competition prevails over the exercise 
of  other values that are considered more relevant by Parliament (see Article 4(2) of  
Competition Act 15/2007).72
C. Administration as possible actor in a cartel 
Lots of  different views have been offered about the possibility of  competition 
authorities to consider the administration as passive part in an antitrust behaviour 
and therefore to consider it part of  an infringement.73 
The Supreme Court judgement dated 26 April 2010 establishes that [...] “In 
the face of  this partial exclusion from the subjection of  the actions of  public administrations to 
competition law when they act in their role as public administrations, it is necessary to assert that 
they are fully subject to the said regulations, (…). Indeed, the fact that economic actors are mentioned 
in the said provision should not be understood as meaning that only those actors subject to private 
law and not those subject to administrative law are liable to sanctions under the said legislation, 
67 Alfredo González-Panizo Tamargo, “Legitimación activa de la CNC para el ejercicio de acciones 
jurisdiccionales: consideraciones generales, motivos de impugnación y supuestos de intervención 
judicial” in Cuestiones actuales…; Jorge Masía; José María Jiménez-Laiglesia Oñate, “Promoción de la 
competencia” in Derecho de la competencia y regulación… 
68 See, for example, the recommendations for public administrations conducive to more efficient 
market regulation that favours competition in the document Trabajando por la Competencia [“Working 
for Competition”] by the CNC, prepared in line with OECD and EU directives.  
69 Arseni Gilbert, “Regulación y competencia” in Administración y Competencia - Un análisis de la labor 
general de la Administración y una especial mirada a la situación de competencia en los puertos, ed. Maria Pilar 
Canedo Arrillaga (Cizur Menor: Aranzadi-Thomson Reuters, 2015): 91-100. 
70 It is not unusual to find reports from competition authorities that bring to light dysfunctions 
caused to competition by certain regulations which are systematically ignored by public authorities, 
with the harm thus done to consumers and users of  services being valued less highly than the 
corporate interests protected. In this regard see, for example, the situation as regards the regulation 
of  public passenger transport (taxis) in several of  Spain’s autonomous regions (Report nº. 14/11 
of  the Andalusian competition authority on the draft bill for the regulation of  public passenger 
transport services in saloon cars). 
71 Luis Antonio Velasco San Pedro, “La regulación económica como barrera a la competencia: 
liberalización y política de mejora de su calidad” in Derecho de la competencia y regulación… 
72 Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia, BOE nº 159, de 4 de julio de 2007; 
modificada por Ley 39/2010, de 22 de diciembre, BOE-A-2010-19703; Ley 2/2011, de 4 de marzo, 
BOE-A-2011-4117, y Ley 3/2013, de 4 de junio, BOE-A-2013-5940. Texto consolidado https://
www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2007-12946. Juan Espinosa García, “Servicios públicos 
locales y competencia” in Derecho de la competencia y regulación... 
73 Edurne Navarro Varona and   Marcos Rambal, “La aplicación de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia a las Administraciones Públicas que no actúan como operadores económicos en el 
mercado” en Gaceta Jurídica de la Unión Europea y de la competencia, nº 31 (2013): 23-34. 
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but rather as a reference to any actor that acts in the market, even when public administrations 
or publicly owned bodies and companies act subject to a greater or lesser extent to administrative 
law.74 Accordingly, although the aforesaid Additional Provision 6 to the Public Administration 
Procurement Act (RCL 1995, 1485, 1948) states that the company appearing as co-defendant 
is subject to the principles of  disclosure and competition and that its acts must be seen as subject in 
part to administrative law, that does not mean that its external activities cannot be judged in any 
case from the viewpoint of  the regulations on the defence of  competition.”
It is, therefore, clear that public administrations are, insofar as they act as 
economic operators, subject to the competition regulations and must comply with 
same in the drawing up of  contracts, agreements and tenders.75 The idea of  “economic 
activity” is defined broadly in such a way that those activities directly linked to the 
exercising of  State prerogatives are usually excluded from the scope of  action of  the 
competition authorities.76 
In this situation, companies involved in an agreement tend to alledge in court 
that, their actions are based on the principle of  legitimate expectations, in that a 
situation has arisen in which an action by the administration has led them to believe 
that the agreement was lawful.77 
The Spanish Competition Comission strongly refuted this argument. Firms in 
the well-known case of  the sherry wine producers were accused of  price-fixing, i.e. 
practices intended to restrict competition banned under Article 1 of  the Act on the 
Defence of  Competition (LDC) and Article 101 of  the Treaty on the Functioning 
of  the European Union (TFEU).78 The case has been confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of  Spain.79
The organisations representing producers and processors in the Sherry Triangle 
alleged legitimate expectations as a mitigating circumstance, given that the Spanish 
Ministry of  Agriculture and Andalusian Regional Ministry of  Agriculture were aware 
of  the facts.
The principle of  legitimate expectations, as set out in Article 3.1.1 of  the Act 
for the Reform of  the Legal Framework of  Public Administrations, does indeed 
establish that public administrations must comply with the principles of  good 
faith and legitimate expectations.80 However the said principal must be interpreted 
restrictively and within the scope of  the law, which means that legitimate expectations 
can only be generated by those authorities which are competent to authorise the acts 
in question.81
Indeed, the principle of  legality must be understood to prevail over any manifestly 
74 Carlos Padrós Reig, “La presencia de la Administración Pública en cárteles privados: la regulación 
administrativo-colusoria” in Revista General de Derecho Administrativo, nº 32 (2013): 1-26. 
75 See the Guide to Public Procurement and Competition published by the CNC, based on those of  
the OECD and the EU. 
76 Accordingly, see the judgements of  the European court for illustrative examples of  these two facets 
of  the actions of  public administrations. CJEC 17 February 1993, C-159/91 & C- 160/91, Poucer, 
Assurances Generales de France, and CJEC 19 February 1994, C-364/92, Fluggesellschaft Eurocontrol. 
77 Julio Costas Comesaña; Joaquim Hortalà Vallve, “La tipificación de la actividad de la Administración 
como facilitadora de cárteles” in Anuario de la Competencia (2014), 13-32. 
78 Case-file S/0167/09 Sherry Grape and Wine Producers, rejecting the argument of  legitimate 
expectations. 
79 Judgement of  the Spanish Supreme Court of  20th July 2016. 
80 Julio Costas Comesaña, “La confianza legítima en la actuación de las administraciones públicas 
como límite al derecho de defensa de la competencia” in Derecho de la competencia y regulación… 
81 Supreme Court judgement dated 14 February 2006. 
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unlawful behaviour, even if  the conduct of  the administration is incorrect.82
In the case taken as an example here, the CNC considers that the Ministry of  
Agriculture of  the Regional Government of  Andalucia holds authority in the matter, 
but does not have the authority to determine whether the practices analysed comply 
or not with the rules on the defence of  competition: only the competition authorities 
have that power.83
The silence, or even acquiescence, of  an authority not competent to apply 
competition rules cannot be deemed to generate legitimate expectations. No 
signatory to an agreement could expect such actions to be lawful, given that price-
fixing agreements are prohibited and the sanctions applicable by the competition 
authorities to such behaviour are known.
Action taken by the administration to bring the positions of  operators in a sector 
closer together, leading firms to enter into a restrictive agreement (not imposed or 
caused by the administration) cannot be deemed to generate expectations, excluding 
culpability. 
The administration is, thus, considered as participating in the infringement and 
subject to competition law.84 
D. The role of the administration in public procurement procedures
The administration is also one of  the most relevant actors in the national 
markets through public procurement.85 In European countries, the percentage of  
GDP that public procurement implies is between 20 and 30.86 
Beginning around 20 years ago, there is a general worry in international 
organizations for the non application of  competition rules in public procurement 
procedures and the problems this situation implies in all the economies of  the world.87 
There is a clear relation between competition and corruption and the application of  
82 Supreme Court judgement dated 20 December 2006. 
83 See the judgement of  the Court for the Defence of  Competition (TDC) dated 3 June 1997 
(Dairy Industries), the judgements of  the CNC Council dated 4 June 2009 (Regulatory Council for 
the Sherry Wine Designation of  Origin), 28 July 2010 (Sherry Wines), 26 April 2008 (the Mussel 
Industry Platform) and 13 May 2011 (UNESA); and the Decisions of  the European Commission 
dated 2 April 2003 (French Beef  Producers) and 20 October 2004 (Spanish Raw Tobacco). In the 
case of  Spanish Raw Tobacco, the Committee considered that the alleged mitigating circumstances 
of  coverage by the law and “incitement” by the public administration did not constitute exoneration 
from the obligation to apply competition rules. In the French Beef  Producers Decision, the 
Commission establishes that the Ministry of  Agriculture participated to a large extent in price fixing 
agreements between organisations representing beef  producers and slaughterhouses in France on 
the occasion of  the mad cow disease crisis, and this was actually published in the media. However, 
the active participation of  the Ministry was not sufficient for it to elude competition law even 
though Ministry participation was taken into account as a mitigating factor. 
84 José Carlos Laguna de Paz, Derecho de la competencia y regulación en la actividad de las administraciones 
públicas (Cizur Menor: Civitas, 2011): 153-177. 
85 OCDE, Lineamientos de la OCDE para combatir la colusión entre oferentes en contrataciones públicas, Paris, 
2009. DAF/COMP(2009)1/FINAL]. http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Recommendation_
fighting-bid-rigging-2012-ES. 
86 Antonio Lopez Miño et al, “Buenas y malas prácticas en contratación de la competencia” in 
Administración y Competencia… 
87 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Recommendation of  the OECD 
Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement. 17 July 2012. http://www.oecd.org/daf/
competition/RecommendationOnFightingBidRigging2012.pdf. Mercedes Pedraz, “Los contratos 
públicos y la defensa de la competencia” in Derecho de la competencia y regulación …. 
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competition rules can be a way of  triyng to stop this tendency.88
The recent EU Directives on Public Procurement have shown a huge step in 
the application of  competiton principles to public procurement and the show the 
interest of  the organisation in protecting fairness in the market through transparency, 
equality of  opportunities and protection of  weaker parties.89
The application of  competition rules to public procurement implies in a relevant 
number of  cases, bid rigging practices.90 This implies that companies alter the rules 
of  a public tender in order to change the selection that would be more efficient for 
the administration and obtaining a result that would be better for their interest and 
therefore, negative for the public interest.91 
The harm created by these agreements is comparable to the one created by the 
cartels, but the fact that they modify public procurement procedures and therefore, 
imply public money, make them much more harmful to society.92 
These kinds of  agreements are also much more difficult to detect because the 
administration is not as flexible as particulars in the process of  contracting and also, 
because there is a clear asymmetry of  information and the administration does not 
control the information of  the market as easily as the private companies.93 A clear 
case of  this asymmetry is shown in cases of  parcelation of  the market through 
agreements of  sharing of  contracts of  different administrations. 
There is, nevertheless, another less studied problem of  competition related to 
public procurement and this is created by the administration through the conscious 
or inconciour incorrect design of  the call for proposals in a tender procedure.94 
The role of  the competition authority in these cases is also very relevant 
because they should have to be able to convince the administration about the 
benefits that competition brings to public procurement procedures before they are 
open to the public.95 This can be done through cooperation between the contracting 
88 Miguel Cuerdo Mir, “Subastas y contratación administrativa desde la perspectiva económica del 
derecho de la competencia” in Derecho de la competencia y regulación… 
89 M. Browsher, UK Procurement Law: principles and practice. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); Albert 
Sánchez Graells, “Public Procurement ; An Overviiew of  EU and National Case Law (from an EU 
Competition Law Perspective)” in E-Competitions, National Competitions Laws Bulletins, issue 40647 
(2011); Albert Sánchez Graells, “Competition Neutrality in Public Procurement and Competition 
Policy: An Ongoing Challenge Analised in View of  the Proposed New Directive” in, Conference 
Papers, ed. International Public Procurement Conference (IPPC), 2012; Robert D. Anderson; William 
E. Kovacic, “Competition Policy and International Trade Liberalisation: Essential Complements 
to Ensure Good Performance in Public Procurement Markets”, in Public Procurement Law Review, vol. 
18 (2009): 67-101; Maria Pilar Canedo Arrilaga, “An attempt to increasing competition in public 
procurement: one example in the Basque Country”, in Fostering Growth in Europe: Reinforcing the 
Internal Market, ed. J.M. Beneyto et al (Madrid: CEU, 2014), 365-389; Petros C. Mavroidis et al, The 
internationalization of  government procurement regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
90 Francisco Hernandez Rodriguez, “Contratación y Competencia” in Administración y Competencia… 
91 Guillermo Aranzabe Pablos, “Contratación administrativa y administración local en la Autoridad 
Vasca de la Competencia. El caso Pinosolo”, in Estudios de Deusto; v. 63/1 (2015): 131-148. 
92 Fernando Jiménez Latorre and Javier Coronado Saleh, “Análisis económico de la colusión en 
mercados de subastas: pujas fraudulentas (Bid rigging)”, in Los acuerdos horizontales entre empresas, ed. 
Santiago Martinez Lage et al (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), 213–242 
93 Maria Pilar Canedo Arrillaga, “Algunas consideraciones jurídicas en torno a prácticas de ‘Bid 
Rigging’”, in Gaceta Jurídica de la Unión Europea y de la Competencia,  issue 36 (2013): 9-19. 
94 R.C. Marshall and L.M. Marx, The economics of  Collusion. Cartels and Bid rigging (Massachussets: The 
MIT Press, 2012). 
95 Javier Guillén Caramés, “La promoción de la competencia como refuerzo al ejercicio de potestad 
sancionadora por parte de las autoridades de competencia: en especial, la impugnación de la 
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administration and the competition authority.96 
The other option open to the competition authority is the possibility of  
challenging the rules of  the tender before the courts, in order for them to decide if  
there is breach of  the competition principles in the prodecure.97 
IV. Conclusions
The role of  public administrations in markets as regulators, providers of  aid, 
economic operators or facilitators of  contracting between companies is highly 
significant and may have a major influence on those markets. The proper exercise of  
these functions results in highly positive values for consumers and in an increase of  
the common good. Improper actions of  the administration can be seriously harmful 
to the general interest. 
In situations of  crisis, relaxing competition regulations may seem to be a 
reasonable, simple solution. However, such action will only exacerbate the crises, 
increase the harm done to consumers and cause long-term damage which the market 
will have great difficulty in reversing.98 
Ensuring the proper operation of  the markets is essential if  periods of  economic 
recession are to be overcome. Economies do not emerge from recessions unaided. 
Economic recovery requires entrepreneurs and innovation, so it is essential for the 
doors to the market to remain open. On the one hand, this prevents governments 
from falling into the temptation of  promoting greater protectionism with the creation 
of  national champions. On the other hand, it ensures that the foundations of  the 
market economy are maintained during crisis periods, and no barriers to economic 
activity are raised that could result in irreversible damage and perpetuate the crisis.
Public administrations must fulfil their mandate of  guaranteeing the general 
good, shying away from sectoral interests that could bring increased short-term 
benefits but result in dysfunctions and harm for the common good and for consumers. 
actividad administrativa contraria al Derecho de la Competencia” en Cuestiones actuales… 
96 Examples of  this cooperation can be found in reports as those cited. CNMC, INF/DP/0007/14 
Informe sobre los pliegos del procedimiento abierto de contratación de servicios consolidados de 
telecomunicaciones de la Administración General del Estado. Madrid, 13 de junio de 2014, en CNMC, 
http://www.cnmc.es/Portals/0/Ficheros/Promocion/Informes_sobre_normativa/2014/201408_
INF_DP_0007_14.pdf; CNMC. INF/DP/0009/14 Informe sobre pliegos del contrato centralizado 
de servicios de seguridad integral y de auxiliares de control en edificios de la Administración General 
del Estado y sus organismos. Madrid, 14 de mayo de 2014, en CNMC, http://www.cnmc.es/
Portals/0/Ficheros/Promocion/Informes_sobre_normativa/2014/201408_INF_DP_0009_14_
INFOR.pdf; CNMC, INF/DP/0012/14 Informe sobre los pliegos del contrato de servicios 
postales de la Administración General del Estado (fase I). Madrid, 25 de junio de 2014, en CNMC, 
http://www.cnmc.es/Portals/0/Ficheros/Promocion/Informes_sobre_normativa/2014/201408_
INF_0012_14_AGE_postales.pdf; CNMC, INF/CNMC/004/15 Informe sobre los pliegos que 
rigen la celebración del acuerdo marco para la contratación de servicios de desarrollo de sistemas de 
administración electrónica; 29 de septiembre de 2015; 19 págs; www.cnmc.es. 
97 Alfredo González-Panizo Tamargo, “Legitimación activa de la CNC para el ejercicio de acciones 
jurisdiccionales: consideraciones generales, motivos de impugnación y supuestos de intervención 
judicial” in Cuestiones actuales… 
98 In the words of  the former Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, “no-one wins - today’s 
softness is tomorrow’s nightmare”. 
